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In the midst of the most serious economic and political 
crises since its founding seven decades ago, there have been 
significant developments in Soviet Asian policy within the 
framework of global detente during the past two years. Follo­
wing the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games, with the Gorbachev-Den 
Xiaoping summit in Beijing, Sin-Soviet rapprochement was ac­
complished, mainly according to terms set out by Beijing. 
Then, with another summit between Gorbachev and Roh Tae Woo, 
the Soviet Union and South Korea established diplomatic rela­
tions in 1990. At the same time, Soviet-Japanese relations 
also experienced some progress. These developments pose a 
sharp contrast to the typical Soviet Cold War attitude towards 
Northeast Asia, which was characterised by an accelerated 
military build up beginning in the late 1960s in the Soviet 
Far East and strategic alignment with North Korea and Vietnam, 
directed against the US-led alliance and China. This altera­
tion of Soviet Asian policy has deep political and economic 
reasons. It shows that under great political and economic 
pressure within the society, the Soviet Union endeavours to 
reduce international tension and build new ties of economic 
cooperation. The alteration also indicates that in search of 
new economic partners to revive its collapsing economy, the 
Kremlin is willing to distance itself from North Korea, a 
country that has been its most important Cold War ally (given 
there were not any better candidates) in Northeast Asia.
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In an attempt to analyse why there are such major 
changes in international relations in Northeast Asia, I am 
going to compare the Soviet Union's Asian policy of two per­
iods: pre-Olympic (1985-1989) and post-Olympic (1989-present). 
Alterations of Soviet Asian policy are going to be reviewed 
against the changing economic and political settings of the 
Soviet and the neighbouring Asian societies.
The ultimate purpose of this paper is to establish that 
issues such as the evolution of the Soviet mode of production, 
its development into a military superpower, perestroika and 
foreign policy adjustments under Gorbachev are all interrela­
ted. My argument is, in the Soviet Union, defence industria­
lization based on central planning fails to develop a sus­
tainable economy to cover the increasing cost of fulfilling 
the country's security goals. The problem first comes from 
the centralised economic structure. Military over-stretch 
places further stress on the economy. Structural economic fai­
lures, coupled with the magnitude of pressures on the eco­
nomy that stem from military over-stretch, among other impor­
tant domestic and international developments, such as leader­
ship change and global detente, finally led the country to 
restructure its international relations in the Northeast Asian 
region.
To do this, the first chapter deals with the economic 
foundation of Soviet foreign and defence policy. This illu­
strates that in the centralized model, sustainable economic 
growth (which is the very foundation of a state's military
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strength) became an obvious problem for the system towards the 
late 1970s. Based on this premise, the second chapter then 
discusses Soviet policy towards Northeast Asia in the 1985- 
1989 period. This is a significant period in Soviet history 
because it marked the end of the Brezhnev era. It was a deve­
lopment that allowed Gorbachev to experiment with radical 
policy changes and adjustments. It was also a period when 
Soviet policy towards Northeast Asia came under increasing 
political and economic pressure (internal and external) for 
change. The third chapter focuses on policy changes in the 
1989-present period. Finally, the fourth chapter looks at the 
implications of the Soviet policy change to international re­
lations in Northeast Asia. The Soviet Far East and Siberia's 
position within this changing policy framework will also be 
addressed in the paper.
My argument will be laid out within Strange's theoretic 
framework of structural power. Strange established that there 
are four basic structures in the operation of international 
political economy. They are: security, production, knowledge 
and finance. Each state, through its control over security, 
production, credit, and knowledge, beliefs and ideas, parti­
cipates in the international political economy.1 These four 
forces all operate within and between societies. On the one 
hand, domestic politics and economics are thus closely related 
to a society's international behaviour; on the other hand, in­
teraction of these four forces between societies constantly 
shapes and reshapes international relations. In other words, 
while there are political and economic forces (like production
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and finance) operating in the international security struc­
ture, security concerns of each society also have profound 
impact on domestic and international politics and economics.
Chapter I: Economic Foundation of Soviet Foreign Policy
Defence-oriented Industrialisation. The Soviet political/ 
economic system was laid out by early leaders of the October 
revolution. Up till today, this political/economic system has 
been the basic foundation of the Soviet society (although this 
political/economic system has seriously deteriorated in the 
past few years). Marx had expected communist revolution to 
succeed first in the most developed capitalist states. In fact 
it broke out in Russia which was comparatively backward in in­
dustrial development based on a small industrial proletariat. 
As soon as the Bolsheviks had secured their power within the 
society, the Soviet leaders were under the impression that the 
capitalist powers were ready to attack the Soviet Union. In 
order to counter the threat, rapid industrialization was need­
ed. In 1931, Stalin said that "one feature of the history of 
old Russia was the continual beatings she suffered because of
her backwardness........  All [foreign powers] beat her --
because of her backness, because of her military backwardness 
..." Although Stalin was exaggerating in this statement, he 
did it in the interest of the particular policy of rapid indu­
strialization. Having been born out of a war, and feeling 
acutely threatened by potential enemies —  Poland, Japan, Bri­
tain and Germany —  military strength based on a strong heavy
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industry became a necessity for the USSR from the late 1920s 
and early 1930s.
Marx's work, although widely regarded as one of the most 
important foundation stones of Soviet society, left many am­
biguities and uncertainties for those who attempted to build 
communism on the basis of his principles. In part this was 
due to the incomplete nature of the work. Only volume 1 of 
Capital was finished. Volumes 2, 3, and 4 remained in draft. 
Most of Marx's view on the state and the world market appeared 
in his short articles, manuscripts and letters. Never has 
such a powerful political movement arisen on the basis of wri­
tings which apparently contained so little systematic discus­
sion of politics and the state.^
Therefore, for years in the 1920s there were intense 
economic debates among the Soviet leadership over how an iso­
lated Soviet Union with a backward and overwhelmingly agrarian 
economy, cut off from foreign capital, could establish a 
modern, self-reliant industrial economy and society laying the 
foundation for communism. In short, a way must be found to 
achieve rapid economic development under conditions that do 
not permit the classic Western road to modernity.
Although Lenin played an important role in the esta­
blishment of the political and economic foundation of the 
Soviet Union, he did not live long enough to go further than 
just laying down a few principles of building a proletarian 
society. Such principles were to be developed by Stalin. As
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Stalin saw it, only a limited amount of time remained before 
his enemies, both inside and outside, would attempt to destroy 
his regime. To speed up the industrialisation effort, Stalin 
concluded that he had to have a centralised system of plan­
ning. To make up time, the planning bureau placed its prime 
emphasis on heavy industry. Reflecting the stress on speed, 
factory managers were judged according to how much more they 
produced in the current year as compared to the year before. 
Inevitably, this focused the economy's attention on quantity 
rather than quality.
The rationale for this was that by first concentrating 
on heavy industry, the country would be able to build up a 
much larger productive capacity in the long run. Then the 
heavy industry could be converted to the production of con­
sumer goods at what was assumed would be a record rate. This, 
in turn, would bring unprecedented prosperity for the workers 
and peasants.4 This perception was based on a firm conviction 
of the early leaders that with a central command economic 
model, with detailed planning and state protection, the 
economy could grow in a quantitative way. In other words, 
with sufficient input, certain output could be expected. This 
idea came from a pre World War II era, when many new techno­
logical revolutions were yet to exert an impact on human 
societies.
But where did the capital come from for this heavy in­
dustry oriented industrialisation? The solution was that 
"primitive socialist accumulation" was to cut back sharply on
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the resources which had traditionally gone to agriculture, 
light industry, and the consumer. In other words, to accu­
mulate the resources necessary for growth in heavy industry, 
Soviet planners found it necessary to set investment, and thus 
savings rates, as high as 30 percent of the GNP. Much of this 
capital Stalin intended to extract from the agricultural sec­
tor by paying very little to the peasants for their efforts. 
Consequently, consumption and consumer goods were given a low 
priority and there were few resources available in the way of 
either manufactured or agricultural products for consumption.5
Therefore, the first important aspect of the Soviet 
society was that the state became an instrument for forced 
modernisation. As observed by Harrington, when Stalin came to 
power, he successfully carried out a remarkable industriali­
sation programme in the course of a decade by bringing totali­
tarian force to bear on the peasants and workers, the social 
classes that supposedly dominated the society. Between 1929 
and 1934, the Soviet peasantry was forced into collective 
farming. Grain was exported to obtain hard currency to buy 
capital goods abroad even though people were starving.^ Since 
there would be little immediate economic reward for the 
workers and peasants who bore of most of the burden, there was 
little likelihood that such a programme would be very popular. 
Thus, the instruments of power would have to be firmly con­
trolled by the leaders of the state. The dictatorship of the 
proletariat thus rapidly became dictatorship over the prole­
tariat . ^
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However, it must be noted that in spite of all the 
cruelty of the Soviet system in its early days, great efforts 
were made (especially in the 1950s) to turn it into one that 
provides basic economic security to the majority of members of 
the society. Such a system was designed to facilitate mobili­
zation of the masses for political ends. In Lenin's words,
When every labourer, every unemployed worker, every 
cook, every ruined peasant sees, not from the 
newspapers, but with his own eyes, that the proletarian 
state is not cringing to wealth but is helping the poor, 
that this state does not hesitate to adopt revolutionary 
measures, that it confiscates surplus stocks of 
provisions from the parasites and distributes them to 
the hungry, that it forcibly installs the homeless in 
the houses of the rich... that the land is being 
transferred to the working people and the factories and 
the banks are being placed under the control of the 
workers ... when the poor see and feel this, no 
capitalist or kulak forces, no forces of world finance 
capital which manipulates thousands of millions, will 
vanquish the people's revolution; on the contrary, the 
socialist revolution will triumph all over the world for it is maturing in all countries.®
Such provision of basic social welfare became another 
important aspect of the Soviet society. For example, to keep 
the Soviet populace happy, transportation and food prices were 
held artificially low through state subsidies, so that "meat 
costing the state $4 a pound to produce sells for 80 cents a 
pound". While the Soviet government was compelled to invest 
$78 billion in agriculture each year, a further 50 billion was 
spent every year to subsidize food prices.9 Actually, since 
1928, the pricing system in the Soviet Union had never been 
changed until very recently. Welfare programmes like this not 
only encouraged waste and inefficiency, and removed the popu­
lation's enthusiasm and incentive to work hard, they also
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became an unbearable financial burden for the central trea­
sury .
Yet another aspect of the Soviet society is that the 
state sets the production quotas, allocates resources, and 
distributes wealth according to detailed plans drawn up in 
the State Planning Commission (Gosplan). The logic is that 
the state needs absolute and unchallenged power over society 
to enable it to mobilise human and natural resources for more 
rapid modernisation. While this did help to bring about rapid 
and steady industrial growth (until the late 1970s the Soviet 
growth rate averaged 5% per annum), it poses serious problems 
for market-oriented perestroika which began in the mid-1980s. 
As far as the role of the state in the economy is concerned, 
as noted above, proletarian dictatorship tends to suppress the 
development of liberal-type regulatory mechanisms.^ These 
include such mechanisms as law, which is formulated through an 
open legislative process; a taxation system which provides a 
flexible means to collect revenue from free enterprises; and a 
credit system which funnels funds from society for rein­
vestment. The logic of central command is different. The 
state does not shape the economy through these indirect means 
but controls the economy by direct bureaucratic planning. In 
other words, there is no need to develop these mechanisms to 
regulate the economy. Although some form of legal, tax and 
credit systems exist in the Soviet Union, their functions in 
the economy are supplementary.
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Thus, dictatorship, social welfare programmes relying 
totally on state subsidy and central planning became the basic 
characteristics of the Soviet society. Once set in motion, 
this Stalinist defence industrialization became the political/ 
economic logic governing the Soviet mode of production, which 
in turn is the material basis for Soviet international beha­
viour. This political/economic logic has remained intact with 
some variations for some six decades.^
As perceived by generations of Soviet leaders, the USSR 
was surrounded by hostile forces. After World War II, Soviet 
leaders were convinced that military alliance systems in 
Europe and Asia organized and maintained by the United States 
were all directed against the USSR. In the mid-1950s, the So­
viet Union tried to get the Americans out of Japan by propos­
ing to return some "Northern territories" and conclude a peace 
treaty between the two countries. Things did not work out 
that way, and Japan was actually turned into an American 
military base and a close ally. This strategic environment 
for the Soviet Union actually deteriorated from the late 1950s 
and early 1960s following the Soviet-Sino split. The feel­
ing of being threatened was subsequently compounded by the 
Sino-US rapprochement. Developments such as these in turn 
strengthened the Soviet determination to continue along the 
path of defence-oriented industrialization.
Forced modernisation was indeed achieved because of the 
concentrated and undisputed utilisation of resources in cer-
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tain sectors of the economy. At the end of World War II, as 
noted by Geoffrey Jukes,
the Soviet Union had armed forces totalling 11.365 
million men. However, their configuration was that of 
a very strong regional, rather than a global power, 
namely very large ground forces supported by 
predominantly short-range tactical air forces and a navy 
mostly devoted to guarding the army's coastal flanks.
The strategic bomber force was small, while the navy had 
little high seas capability. Amphibious forces were 
improvised as needed, usually for relatively small and 
short-range operations, and there were no nuclear weapons.
By the late-1960s, the Soviet Union had become one of the two 
most powerful military powers in the world.
However, it is a system in which economic growth depends 
almost solely on the expansion of investment according to 
plans drawn up in the state bureaucracy. It fails to provide 
a sophisticated economic sustainability developed in the 
advanced capitalist societies over some two hundred years.
Such economic sustainability requires far more than an expan­
sion of investment. It requires constant interaction between 
technology and production, it needs incentive and initiative 
from the society.
In fact, the above three characteristics in the Soviet 
society all became factors that work to eliminate incentives 
for economic growth and social progress from the system. To­
wards the end of the 1970s, this became more and more obvious, 
although one can argue that there are still some incentives 
for economic progress as far as the state is concerned. It 
is the state that draws up development plans and guides
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economic progress. Nevertheless, if the rigidity and the in­
effectiveness of the rosy economic blue print in the later 
Five Year Plans, and the often indifferent attitude of the 
bureaucrats are taken into consideration, it can hardly be 
called "incentives". After all, the bureaucratic planners 
represent only a very narrow stratum in the society. While 
the central command model may have worked well at an earlier 
stage of Soviet development, it has later become counterpro­
ductive. As Marshall Goldman puts it,
The continued emphasis on heavy industry and central 
planning has resulted in the neglect of consumer goods 
and this, in turn, has come to generate more and more 
skepticism and cynicism among Soviet consumers. Because 
there is relatively little to buy, the consumer ends up 
with very large savings and very little respect for 
money. Thus money is not much of an inducement to work. Not surprisingly, therefore, the shortcomings in 
consumer-goods production, magnified by serious food shortages, have had a serious effect on workers' 
incentives and, more important, worker discipline. ... Almost seventy-two years after the revolution, the 
Soviet Union has found it necessary to reintroduce rationing.
At the production level, since Soviet factories and col­
lective farms cannot go out of business, as in a market econ­
omy, they also lack the ultimate stimulus to produce effi­
ciently. As a result, there has always been incredible waste 
and inefficiency in every sector of the economy. A century 
ago, Russia used to be one of the biggest grain exporters in 
the world. Today, the Soviet Union is one of the biggest 
grain importers.
In terms of technological innovation (especially in the 
civilian sphere of the economy), there are also structural
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setbacks that make the Soviet Union lag behind the West. 
Take, for example, an issue posed by the new technologies. 
The Russian government, modeling its arrangements on those of 
early eighteenth-century French and British Science Academies, 
built up over the subsequent two centuries a distinguished 
Academy of Sciences, which was carried forward and greatly 
expanded in the Soviet Union. No one doubts that Soviet mate­
rials researchers or aircraft designers are brilliant. Nor 
that Soviet defence factories can use their work and turn out 
effective weaponry and space-craft. But that is no guide to 
managerial efficiency. It is not hard to be effective when 
your every need is catered for in a protected economy. In 
other words, although Soviet scientists and engineers are 
among the best in the world, their ties to those beyond their 
bureaucracies are often limited. Apart from those government 
assigned projects that are mostly related to military and 
heavy industrial production, there is no natural connection 
between their talent and expertise and social production. 
This did not matter so much in the era of steel, electric po­
wer plants, cement and other technologies rooted in the pre- 
1914 world. In the new round of technological competition, 
technologies become increasingly flexible, interacting, often 
based on a high degree of computerization and information 
sharing, and require day-to-day linkage of the R&D institutes 
to the production process. For the Soviet Union, it has pro­
ven difficult to bring about new technological developments 
without radical institutional change.^ As experiences in the 
United States show, in this new era, technological innovation 
requires not only a strong management-R&D linkage, but indi-
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vidual incentives as well.14 In fact, not only the Soviet
Union, but all countries modeled on the Stalinist model, have 
found it difficult to provide incentives for technological 
innovation for reasons discussed in previous paragraphs.
In sum, until the 1970s, the Soviet economy grew rapid­
ly. However, while the Soviet model performed well in the 
early years of the country's industrialisation, it has failed 
badly over the past two decades. There is a general consen­
sus in the Western academic world that the retardation in 
Soviet growth rates reflects a combination of diminishing re­
turns to capital accumulation and declining rates of "tech­
nical change".1  ^ Beginning from the 1970s, the state actually 
became an obstacle to modernization. It is a system run by a 
bureaucracy that does not have the benifit and cost mentality 
in its production, management, and distribution. In virtual­
ly all sectors of the economy, evidence of stagnation, waste, 
and mismanagement proliferates. As admitted by Gorbachev at 
the Twenty-seventh Communist Party Congress:
Difficulties began to build up in the economy in the 
1970s, with the rates of economic growth declining 
visibly. As a result, the targets for economic 
development set in the Communist Party programme, and 
even the lower targets of the 9th and 10th 5-year plans 
were not attained. Neither did we manage to carry out 
the social programme charted for this period. A lag 
ensued in the material base of science and education, 
health protection, culture and everyday services.
Though efforts have been made of late, we have not 
succeeded in fully remedying the situation. There are 
serious lags in engineering, the oil and coal 
industries, the electrical engineering industry, in 
ferrous metals and chemicals, in capital construction. 
Neither have the targets been met for the main
_l <3 o ouanuaj-u j. 11 vj.ny .
improvement of the
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As a matter of fact, Soviet leaders have long recog­
nized that there are serious problems in the system, as evi­
dent in Khrushchev and Kosygin's attempts at reform. However, 
once set in train, the rigid central command model would 
operate along its own logic and things cannot be changed 
without up-rooting the most important Leninist-Stalinist 
principles governing its operation. In effect, all previous 
reform attempts ended in minor moderations instead of a 
radical change. As Goldman demonstrates, the Russians 
continue to adhere to a dictatorial planning model set forth 
by Stalin in the 1920s. It is on such an economic foundation 
that Soviet policy towards North-east Asia evolved.
What is more, for decades, the Soviet Union has been 
sealed off not only from international economic competition of 
any kind, but from major developments in the world economy 
such as the explosive expansion of international trade and 
investment, participation in the international economic re­
gimes and information/technology transfer. This gradually 
leads to a steady decline in the Soviet Union's competitive­
ness as compared to its capitalist counterparts in Northeast 
Asia, a trend which became obvious in the late 1970s and early 
1980s, as Mr. Gorbachev admitted in the 27th Party Congress. 
On the other hand, the need to make use of whatever economic 
cake baked in the central command oven to meet ever-increasing 
security demands further deteriorated the economic situations 
in the Soviet Union.
Page - 18
Pre-Gorbachev Soviet Asian Policy. It is on such an economic 
premise that the Soviet Union's policy towards Northeast Asia 
evolved. It must be noted that although economic stagnation 
became obvious towards the late 1970s and early 1980s, Soviet 
leaders of the time failed to address these economic problems. 
In regard to Soviet Asian policy, on the diplomatic front, 
Brezhnev expressed the Soviet intention of improving relations 
with China as early as March 1982. However, there were no fun­
damental changes in Soviet foreign and domestic policies be­
fore Gorbachev came to power in 1985. The two transitional 
leaders, Andropov and Chernenko, both were too old and sick to 
carry out policy reform. Thus, on the military front, mili­
tary buildup and strategic alignment with China's neighbours 
continued unabated. In fact, the USSR has been locked into a 
security dilemma since its early days. Once national security 
became the priority of the Soviet Union, it would be difficult 
to change the course in which things operate in the Soviet 
system. For example, to keep up the arms race with the United 
States, the disproportionately huge investment in heavy indu­
stries and defence could not possibly be reduced. As early as 
1973, Abel Aganbegyan, who now serves as Gorbachev's foremost 
economic adviser, said that "our national income is only 65% 
of the US, yet it is obvious that we cannot spend less than 
the US does on national defence. This means that the defence 
burden of our country is much greater than that of the US."17 
Again, as far as the prioritization of national defence is 
concerned, central planning was the most effective way to 
guarantee such a financial arrangement.
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As discussion in previous pages indicates, in the Soviet 
Union, economic stagnation began in the late 1970s This coin­
cides with two important developments in international rela­
tions as far as the Soviet Union is concerned. The first de­
velopment was the technological revolution based on the deve­
lopment of computer and other information technologies which 
went through several breakthroughs towards the late 1970s, 
when the world entered what is called the "microelectronic" 
age. In this new age, technology tends to be information­
intensive. This microelectronic revolution allows the merging 
of all activities such as managerial and production, market­
ing, financial as well as technical into an interacting sys- 
tem,10 within and between the developed capitalist societies. 
Over the last twenty-five years, international trade has grown 
at a compounded rate of 13% per year, whereas it had pre­
viously never grown at more than 3%. Even more impressive, 
international banking transactions have compounded at an an­
nual rate of almost 28% a year; and during that period the 
Eurocurrency market alone mushroomed from 7 billion to 3 
trillion dollars.19 In other words, in the United States, 
Japan, and many Western European countries, such technological 
innovations were blended with their economic and social infra­
structures and became powerful forces that push these socie­
ties forward, economically and, in the case of the US, mili­
tarily. Thus, while these countries enter a new, postindus­
trial era where progress is measured more and more by computer 
technology, the Soviet Union still lingers in an old indus­
trial era where it is measured by output of coal, steel, and 
cement. In the Soviet Union, industrial development still de-
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pends on technology that is energy and materials intensive. 
As a result, the gap in economic strength between the deve­
loped capitalist West and the Soviet Union has significantly 
widened since the late 1970s. Given the structural setbacks 
of the Soviet economic system, it is obvious that the country 
could not effectively respond to the new technological chal­
lenges of the new era.
The second development is that China, under Deng Xiao­
ping, began a most ambitious economic reform and entered what 
the Soviets viewed as a military alliance relationship with 
the United States. From the Soviet point of view, this rela­
tionship formed an international anti-Soviet united front. 
Since the Sino-Soviet border conflict in 1969 and Nixon's 
China visit in 1971, the Soviet fear of fighting on two fronts 
in the event of war at the same time (in Europe and in the Far 
East) was magnified by this perceived Chinese threat.
Partly as a continuation of its traditionally mili­
tarized foreign policy and partly in response to the American 
military assertiveness based on economic strength and the 
Sino-American anti-Soviet alignment, the Soviet Union entered 
a new round of the arms race with the United States and 
greatly expanded its strategic commitments in Asian countries 
like Vietnam, North Korea, and Mongolia to counter the Chinese 
threat. In 1979, Soviet troops invaded Afghanistan. These 
countries are all economically backward, and most of them suf­
fer from the same structural setbacks as those of the Soviet 
Union in their economic systems. Therefore, Soviet economic
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ties with them are bound to be unprofitable. In order to 
maintain these political and strategic alliances, massive mi­
litary and economic aid was needed.
According to Moscow itself, part of the "aid" consists 
of the Soviet habit of paying inflated prices for goods: seven 
to nine times more for Cuban sugar, swollen prices for Viet­
namese cement. A second type of "aid" involves selling goods 
far below the market price, as Soviets sell oil to Cuba and 
North Korea. A third form consists of providing services at 
virtually no cost, as when the Soviet commit 300 ships to 
transporting Cuban products, thus freeing Cuban ships for pro­
fitable engagements. A fourth form is the provision of credit 
on fantastic terms, such as allowing Mongolia 200 years to 
reimburse funds for a poultry farm.^O
According to Soviet economists, nonequivalent conditions 
of trade with Cuba currently cost the Soviet Union US$6-10 
billion a year. To keep its strategic ally in Central America 
functioning, the USSR has to support an economy where "not one 
sector" fulfilled the planned quotas in 1989 except for tran­
sport and sugar production. Soviet economists also note that 
their trade is disadvantageous not only with socialist coun­
tries in the Third World, but with Poland, Czechoslovakia and 
East Germany. Under current practices the Soviet Union subsi­
dises the reorientation of the economies of Eastern Europe at 
a time it can ill afford to do so.^
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Domestically, to counter the Chinese threat, military 
expenditure continued to rise. In late 1986 a report from the 
NATO Economic Committee stated that Soviet military expendi­
tures rose by 50% between 1970 and 1985, or 2.7% a year.22 
The CIA's estimate claimed that throughout the 1980's the 
Soviet economy was thought to be more than half the size of 
America's, and 15% of its budget was devoted to arms. As a 
matter of fact, Soviet economic strength was a lot weaker, 
while its military expenditure was more than what the West 
believed. According to recently released Soviet official fi­
gures, while the Soviet output was about one-fourth that of 
American output —  not nearly the half that the CIA estimates, 
Soviet military expenditure was 20 to 25% of GNP.22 It must 
be stressed again that these Soviet strategic commitments as 
well as a new round of the arms race were conducted by an 
economically stagnant society.
Soviet Far East and Siberia. The definition for Soviet Far 
East in this paper denotes all Soviet territory East of Lake 
Baikal, and Sibera comprises West and East Siberia. Since the 
strategic, political and economic values of these areas are 
being re-defined by the Soviet leadership, the Soviet Far 
East, West Siberia and East Siberia are treated as a whole re­
gion in this paper unless specifically defined.
One the one hand, partly because of the Stalinist tradi­
tion of defence industrialization, partly because of the ex­
tremely harsh natural conditions for profitable economic deve­
lopment, and partly because of traditional militant Soviet
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foreign policy towards Asia in dealing with the US-Japan-South 
Korea alliance, and the Chinese threat later, emphasis was 
given to military buildup in the Soviet Far East in the pre- 
Gorbachev era. On the other hand, From a strategic point of 
view, Siberia traditionally offer the USSR great strategic 
depth. It allows for the dispersed location of its popula­
tion, key military industries and the location of the majori­
ty of the Soviet Union's intercontinental ballistic missile 
silos. Since the Sino-American rapprochement in the early 
1970s, the region was suddenly threatened by a defacto mili­
tary alliance between two countries hostile to the Soviet 
Union: the United States and China. Military threat to the 
region used to come mainly from possible amphibious attack of 
the US-Japan-South Korea forces, but now the area was vulner­
able to massive Chinese ground forces as well. Siberia no 
longer offered any strategic depth. As the Soviet leadership 
saw it, "the broadening of military-political links of the 
USA with China and with Japan which is going in the direction 
of militarization creates a long term military threat to our 
eastern frontiers."^4 Towards the late 1970s, the Soviet per­
ception was that with Deng's economic reform encouraging for­
eign investment and technology transfer, the Soviet Far East 
and Siberia would be especially vulnerable because Chinese 
manpower could be equipped with US and Japanese technology.
The emergence of this threat incurred heavy military ex­
penditure for the Soviet economy at a time when it could ill 
afford to do so. In the Soviet Far East the steps of military 
buildup have quickened since 1969. As a result of this above
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mentioned perception, the one respect in which the Soviet 
Union has improved its position in East Asia over the past 
twenty years is in military strength. Its combat divisions 
along the Chinese frontiers have increased from 20 to more 
than 50. It modernized its naval and air forces and instal­
led SS-20 intermediate range ballistic missiles within range 
of China and Japan.^ Towards the mid-1980s, the Soviet Union 
had formidable military forces stationed in the East Asian- 
Pacific region, including over one-third of its land and sub­
marine based strategic nuclear forces, and one-quarter of its 
army, air and naval forces. These Soviet forces in the region 
have been provided with some of the most modern weapons in the 
Soviet military inventory. These include the Delta-class SSBN, 
Kiev-class aircraft carriers, MiG-25 Foxbat fighters, Tu-22M 
Backfire strike bombers, and SS-20 IRBMs (before they were 
eliminated under the INF Treaty). ^
It must be noted that the transportation network that 
links the Soviet Far East and Siberia with its European 
heartland has always been very poor and costly. To cope with 
the problem, the region was turned into a self-contained 
military region, and in 1978 a semi-independent theatre 
command was set up for the region, while ammunitions was 
stockpiled for at least half a year's fighting. Hence, from 
the security of its Pacific bastion, the Soviet Union can 
threaten Japan, the west coast of America, the sea lanes be­
tween Japan and the US, as well as US military bases in Guam, 
Hawaii, the Philippines and Australia. Also, from across the 
long border it shares with China, the USSR is able to pose a
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military threat to the security of China's western provinces 
and Manchuria.2^
While Soviet military power has grown in North East Asia 
to the point where it rivaled that of the United States, in 
the spheres of political influence in Northeast Asia and 
economic development in the Soviet Far East and Siberia such 
military buildup has been counter-productive. While the 
United States has friendly relations with Japan, China, South 
Korea, Taiwan, and the ASEAN countries, the USSR's only major 
ally is Vietnam. The USSR's other friends, Mongolia, Kampuchea 
and Laos count for little as regional powers. Even in North 
Korea, the USSR has to compete for influence with its adver­
sary, China. One telling example of this militarized Soviet 
Asian policy was that when Japan and China signed a peace 
treaty in 1978, Moscow responded with a rapid military buildup 
on what the Japanese called the "Northern Territories".28 
Such action only served to alarm and offend the Japanese. As 
Soviet military strength in the region has grown, the other 
powers in Northeast Asia have taken an increasingly anti- 
Soviet posture. The pre-Gorbachev Soviet diplomacy in the re­
gion had been marked by a rigidity and toughness that has 
served the USSR's interests poorly and has earned the hosti­
lity and enmity of many of its Asian neighbours. Indeed, there 
was a basic contradiction in Soviet policy which whilst alle­
gedly seeking improved relations with neighbouring countries 
(China and Japan) embarked on a massive expansion of military 
power. These countries feel bullied by the Soviet military 
buildup and the proximity of Soviet military power. As a
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consequence, there have been increasingly strong military ties 
between the US, Japan and South Korea, a de facto Sino- 
American alignment (in spite of the fact that China denies 
it), substantial Japanese rearmament, and a more assertive US 
which was pursuing a vigorous containment policy.^9
In the sphere of Soviet Far East and Siberia economic 
relations with neighouring countries, there were hardly any 
significant ties. After the Sino-Soviet split in the early 
1960s, Soviet foreign trade relations outside the Comecon 
were primarily with Western Europe. Trade with Northeast 
Asian economies only made up 3-4% of total Soviet foreign 
trade. In general, in the last four decades, the Soviet eco­
nomy has basically been closed from the world markets. A large 
proportion of Soviet international trade was conducted with 
Eastern Europe. Soviet imports are mainly confined to agricul­
tural produce, consumer goods, industrial technology and che­
micals. Soviet exports, on the other hand, mainly confined to 
raw materials, energy resources and armaments. Under Brezhnev, 
foreign trade and economic cooperation were to enhance effi­
ciency in order to preclude the need for significant struc­
tural reform. Careful precautions were taken to minimize un­
desirable influences on the Soviet economy and society. For­
eign management and labour practices and foreign competition 
with domestic firms were not tolerated. 0^
Nevertheless, in terms of economic potential, the region 
is one of the world's greatest untapped areas of natural re­
sources. The economic potential of the region as a whole is
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immense since it contains almost three-quarters of the USSR's 
mineral, fuel and energy reserves, over half of its hydroelec­
tric resources, about half of its commercial timber stands. 
The maritime provinces in the Soviet Far East produce one- 
third of its fish catch (including that caught in distand wa­
ters by Soviet Far East-based ships). Nevertheless, as discus­
sion above show, until the end of 1980s, Soviet domestic po­
licy for development in the region as well as its foreign po­
licy towards Northeast Asia were formulated and implemented 
out of strategic and political rather than economic considera­
tions. This does not mean that the Soviet government did not 
commit any industrial and agricultural investment in the 
region at all. In fact, in the mid 1980s, the region as a 
whcle received a quarter of all capital investments in the 
USSR even though it has only about one-tenth of the nation's 
population and accounts for a little over one-tenth of Soviet 
overall economic output.^1
However, economic development in the region is backward. 
Negative factors include, poor infrastructure, especially in 
road transport and communications, labour shortages in speci­
fic industries, particularly construction. Among the problems 
besetting plans to develop these regions was an alleged "col­
onial mentality" among some of the local officials. These 
officials are said to see their careers as centring on Moscow, 
to regard their time in these regions as an interlude, to have 
no intention of settling there, and consequently to have no 
commitment to long-term development there. The region is not 
only far away from Moscow, but from all major provincial indu-
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strial centres. Inevitably, this has meant that under the 
centralization which has so far characterized the Soviet poli­
tical and economic structures, the major decisions affecting 
these regions have been taken at a great distance, and that 
their trade with other parts of the Soviet Union is affected 
by very heavy transport costs. The region is in fact much 
closer to major industrial centres of Japan, South Korea and 
China, but the pursuit of an autarky policy has until recently 
severely restricted commercial interactions with them, to the 
detriment of the region's development.22 In short, up till 
now, the region remains economically under developed, and hea­
vily subsidised by the central government.
Chapter II: Soviet Policy Towards Northeast Asia: 1985-1989
Continuity and Change. When Gorbachev came to power in 1985, 
he dedicated himself to perestroika and glasnost. Domestic 
economic restructuring and reduction of international tension 
became the leadership's priority. Nevertheless, in the period 
of 1985-1989, Gorbachev inherited many aspects of the old 
Soviet Asian policy, which he could not help but continue to 
go in the original direction set by earlier leaders. On the 
other hand, under increasing political and economic pressure 
(internal and external) for change, his new thinking and ap­
pointment of new policy makers like Foreign Minister Shevard­
nadze, Gorbachev managed to kick off some significant changes 
in Soviet Asian policy in this period. However, it was not 
until after the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games that Soviet Asian 
policy went through more fundamental changes. This will be
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discussed in chapter 3 of this paper. In this period, there
was continued military buildup in the Soviet Far East and
strategic commitments with many Asian countries. These
developments placed further strain on the increasingly obso­
lete detailed planning command economy. It should be stressed 
that in this period, there was both change and continuity in 
Soviet Asian policy and attitudes towards Soviet Far East and 
Siberia development.
Mikhail Gorbachev came to power in 1985 inheriting the 
economic and foreign policy legacies of the Breznev era, char­
acterised by its burdensome disabilities. Economically, the 
Soviet Union was a strange mixture of failures and pretensions 
of stagnation since the 1970s. The failures are of course 
manifest: a dilapidated infrastructure, run-down housing,
shortages of consumer goods, pathetic levels of agricultural 
production, declining life expectancies, a budget deficit that 
in proportion to GNP is three times that of the United States. 
In short, a Third World economy with a nuclear arsenal and men 
floating in space.33 At the same time, the Soviet Union's 
diplomacy was characterised by a remarkable degree of isola­
tion, especially in Northeast Asia. It had no major allies in 
the region save for Vietnam (in the case of influence over 
North Korea, the USSR has always had to compete with the PRC) 
Also, there was a growing gap between the Soviet Union's swel­
ling military power and declining influence. Moreover, there 
was a semi-immobile relationship with Northeast Asia's most 
formidable economic powers.
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Untill 1985, the military in the Soviet Union had en­
joyed priority access to national resources for almost all the 
44 years since the German invasion in 1941. Soviet politic- 
military culture differs markedly from Anglo-Saxon tradition. 
Both the US and the UK are mainly sea and air powers, while 
the USSR is mainly a land power. A land power requires large 
number of men, thus the military leaders are more powerful in 
politics because they have millions of men at their disposal. 
A sea power, on the other hand, requires far fewer men. It 
maintains expensive forces for its security, and generally 
speaking, the military does not acquire the political 
influence as that in the case of a land power. For the Rus­
sians, then, the military has been an integral and vital com­
ponent of the state. The tradition was reinforced by Lenin's 
Clausewitzian predilections, and by the realpolitik implica­
tions of the Bolsheviks' early struggle against what appeared 
to be an immensely more powerful coalition of enemies. When 
Gorbachev came to power in 1985, the military probably did 
not foresee the implications of a new General Secretary who 
had done no military service, had no personal or institu­
tional ties to the military, and was a sceptic about the re­
levance of military solutions to national or global pro­
blems . ^ 4
There were quite a few new policy initiatives soon after 
Gorbachev became the leader of the country. Under Gorbachev, 
international politics is not exclusively a matter of class 
struggle or a raw competition between East and West, but is 
more centrally a matter of the intertwining of societies and
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the interdependence imposed on all.35 Thus, Gorbachev's first 
major foreign policy address delivered in Vladivostok in July 
1986 featured Asia, and, within Asia, China. He spoke of his 
government's decision to begin a unilateral reduction of 
Soviet forces stationed in Mongolia, of its interest in build­
ing a new railroad link between Kazakhstan and Xinjiang, and 
of willingness to accede to China's wishes with regard to the 
border along the Amur river. At the same time, Gorbachev 
early on acknowledged the new importance of Northeast Asia's 
mushrooming economic prowess. Hence, Gorbachev sent his new 
foreign minister Eduard Shevardnadze off to Tokyo to begin 
unfreezing what had been immobile for more than a decade (for­
mer foreign minister, Mr. Gromyko, had never visited Japan). 
Shevardnadze's January 1986 trip to Japan did not make much of 
a dent in the core problem dividing the two countries, but it 
opened the door for new hope and flexibility.3^
However, such changes were just initiated but remained 
on paper. To a very large extent, 1985-1989 is a period in 
which the Soviet Union put forward many foreign policy propo­
sals and initiatives, many of which only helped to serve pro­
pagandists purposes. It is an important period in Soviet 
Asian policy development because it laid down the basis for 
more pragmatic and concrete foreign policy changes in the next 
period: 1989-present. Before this time there was a certain de­
gree of continuity in Soviet foreign policy.
This continuity was determined as much by domestic as 
by international factors. For a long time since the Sino-US
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rapprochement, Soviet leaders were afraid that China might 
join with the US and Japan in an "informal entente" directed 
against the USSR. While the Soviet Union has enhanced its mi­
litary capabilities, its gains have been offset by US efforts 
to counter the Soviet buildup. Since the early 1980s, the 
United States under the Reagan administration has signifi­
cantly increased its military spending as well as its forward 
deployed forces in the western pacific. The US now deploys at 
regional military bases in Japan, South Korea and the Phi­
lippines 70 ships and 230 carrier-based aircraft of the US 7th 
Fleet, more than 110,000 servicemen and 350 land-based air­
craft. In Northeast Asia, US forces are supported by the 
armed forces of South Korea and of Japan, which together con­
stitute a major military force.37 This military strength on 
the other side of the Cold War fence is not only a nightmare 
for Soviet generals, but for the leaders and strategists as 
well. Such a nightmare drove the Soviet Union to commit even 
more economic resources into military buildup in the Soviet 
Far East that started in the late 1960s.
The Unbearable Economic Burden. For two decades, in addition 
to this "safeguarding" against possible attack from China, the 
Soviet Union had to spend huge amounts to balance the Warsaw 
Pact budget, because unlike America's allies in NATO, most of 
whom are medium powers and can make bigger economic contri­
bution to the military alliance, the Warsaw Pact countries are 
smaller and far less developed in economic terms. Such deve­
lopments exhausted more and more Soviet resources.
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In Northeast Asia, even after Gorbachev came to power, 
Soviet-North Korea frelations based on Cold War perceptions 
continued to grow. The Soviet-North Korean security treaty 
signed in July 1961 has been regarded as part of Soviet re­
gional efforts to counter what Gorbachev himself called "a US- 
Japanese-South Korean military alliance" in his welcoming 
speech to Kim II Sung in October 1986. After Kim visited 
Moscow in 1984, the Soviets began to provide North Korea some 
60 MiG-23 fighter bombers and 30 SA-3 surface-to-air missiles. 
Under Gorbachev, the Soviet Union has increased its security 
cooperation with North Korea. In recent years, Moscow has 
sold Pyongyang SU-25 Frogfoot attack aircraft, MiG-29 Fulcrum 
and SA-3 and SA-5 surface-to-air missiles. 8^ In return, 
Soviet planes have been given the right to transit North 
Korean air space, and Soviet warships have been granted access 
to the North Korean ports of Wonsan and Nampo. Starting in the 
autumn of 1986, Soviet and North Korean forces conducted joint 
exercises.^  ^
Since 1984, Moscow has been substantially expanding eco­
nomic relations with Pyongyang. According to a South Korean 
estimation of this economic relationship, the USSR accounts 
for over 50% of North Korea's foreign trade (as a contrast, 
North Korea accounts for less than 1% of Soviet foreign 
trade), which reached about US$3.5 billion in 1987. In 1988, 
its exports to North Korea grew to US$1.7 billion, an increase 
o: 32.7% over 1987. In addition to trade, the Soviet Union 
has rendered economic and technological assistance. In recent 
years, the Soviet side has built 70 industrial projects pro-
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ducing about one-quarter of North Korea's gross output, inclu­
ding 63% of its electric power, 50% of its petroleum products, 
and 33% of its steel. North Korea was only able to pay back 
this aid by providing labour for cutting timber in Siberia.40 
Obviously, this economic relationship was in fact a Soviet 
subsidy for North Korea, and the Soviet Union had little to 
gain economically.
Therefore, Vietnam, North Korea, Mongolia and Afghanis­
tan, like Cuba, are potentially bottomless pits for Soviet aid 
and resources. For instance, in 1990, North Korea's total debt 
to the Soviet Union was some 2.2 billion rubles (approximately 
US$3.95 billion). This debt has increased US$700 million in 
only one year to a total of 2.6 billion rubles (approximately 
US$4.6 billion). North Korea is expected to pay back about 500 
million rubles (US$880 million) in 1991 by supplying the So­
viet Union with various goods and services.41 It has also 
been reported that the Mongolian government has informed the 
Soviet Union in May 1990 that it sees no way of repaying its 
nearly 10 billion ruble debt in the near future. Most of the 
money had been used to subsidise consumer prices and develop 
industry and agriculture. Mr. Demchigjavyn Molomjamts, the 
Mongolian Finance Minister, said that Moscow had extended the 
term of the credit several times without charging interest and 
had written off debts of more than 60 million rubles. This 
time, Moscow again "had responded with understanding" and had 
agreed to postpone any decision until the drafting of the two 
countries' next five-year plan (1991-1996) . Moreover, opposi­
tion leaders argue that the real debt is owed by the Soviet
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Union for the "ecological and cultural" damage done to the 
country over the past 70 years.42 Under the new circumstance 
in which the Mongolian Communist Party has to compete against 
other parties for leadership, the repayment of Soviet debt 
will be hotly debated in the years to come. As a matter of 
fact, for the Soviet Union, to support Cuba, Vietnam and North 
Korea is a bankruptcy policy. Altogether these three most im­
portant strategic allies have accumulated a huge debt of some 
25 billion rubles to the Soviet Union.
Domestically, the Soviet economic situation continued to 
deteriorate. As discussions above show, earlier Soviet eco­
nomic competitiveness against the United States and other Wes­
tern countries began to wither away in the 1970s, and the sys­
tem began to slip into economic crisis in the mid-1980s. We 
know that a very important reason for this is the Soviet 
Union's obsessive concern over its military buildup. This has 
become an endless business for the Soviet leaders. In 1984, 
Moscow announced a near 12% increase in its official defence 
budget, purportedly in response to the threat of the Strategic 
Defence Initiative of the Pentagon. This Soviet defence bur­
den is obviously a strain on the economy. The increasing de­
mands for security forced the military buildup to cut into so­
cial programmes. Its traditions, long, exposed borders, and a 
multitude of past and potential enemies predispose the Soviet 
military to quantity, in troops and materiel.43
As in earlier years, in the Gorbachev era, far too many 
resources are tied up in defence and heavy industry. The
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over-concentration on heavy industry has been exacerbating the 
consumption crisis, first by absorbing scarce resources, and 
second by the mismanagement of the nation's wage policy. Wages 
for industrial workers have been steadily increasing (and in­
flating) , boosting demand while the system failed to produce 
consumer goods to help satisfy such demand.
The Other side of the Fence. Some discussion of the political 
economy of the capitalist side of the Northeast Asian Cold War 
alliance is necessary at this juncture. The reason is that 
when the Soviet economic system came to the point of collapse 
in the late 1980s, it was to the Northeast Asian market econo­
mies that the Soviet Union turned for economic aid.
The economic logic in the market economies in Northeast 
Asia is different. Based on American hegemonic assistance, 
and protected by American nuclear deterence, Japan, South 
Korea and Taiwan all have developed highly marketable, export- 
oriented civilian manufacturing industries to compete in the 
international market to assist fund accumulation and techno­
logical upgrade. As a result, civilian manufacturing indus­
tries in these countries have now became highly competitive 
and profitable in the international market.
For the first 25 years of the postwar period, America 
was indeed a hegemon. In trade and finance America had the 
resources to make the side payments and absorb the costs re­
quired to assure international economic stability, to sustain 
a high dollar, and permit others to devalue to bring their
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trade balances in line. It could also offer access to its 
domestic market as an instrument of security policy.44 In 
other words, in order to contain communism effectively, the 
United States was willing to sustain a Eurasian balance and to 
forge a multiplicity of relationships encompassing not only 
defence but also the fields of trade, finance, and investment 
between the US and other nations in Western Europe and the 
Asian Pacific area. Such a multi-faceted relationship between 
the United States and Japan, South Korea and Taiwan has been 
consolidated since the Korean War (1950-1953). In return for 
their military and diplomatic cooperation, in the past four 
decades, Washington has helped Tokyo, Seoul and Taipei to in­
crease their economic power by accepting trade and investment 
relationship based on an implicit understanding that US mar­
kets could be relatively open while those of its allies would 
be much more restrictive. In the case of Japan, as observed 
by Mitchell Bernard, in the decade after the Korean War, cheap 
goods manufactured in Japan flooded the United States market: 
textiles, apparel and plastics came first, then electronics. 
While the American government was willing to subordinate eco­
nomics to politics in its foreign policy, American companies 
had market shares to gain or lose. They responded to cheap 
Japanese goods by moving offshore to the East Asian NICs in 
search of lower production costs to protect their home market 
share and profit levels.4-^ In other words, there has been a 
constant flow of investment and knowledge to these Northeast 
Asian societies from America.
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According to Strange's theory, structural power lies 
with those able to control and distribute credit. Such con­
trol of credit is important because, through it, purchasing 
power can be acquired, and subsequently, technological and in­
dustrial upgrading follows. Structural power can also be exer­
cised by those who possess knowledge, who can wholly or par­
tially limit or decide the terms of access to it. In the case 
of Japanese- South Korean- and Taiwanese-US relations, both at 
government and business levels, contrary to the American atti­
tude of "economic containment" and "technological contain­
ment" towards the USSR,^ critical American technology and in­
dustrial know-how have repeatedly been transferred at low 
cost in the name of military imperatives and business profi­
tability. The tolerant US attitude towards Japanese acquisi­
tion of prohibited Star Wars technology earlier and disputes 
over co-production of Japanese FSX and South Korean FA-18 
fighter aircraft are examples of this behaviour pattern.^ For 
more than three decades (before the Sino-US strategic co­
operation developed in the late 1970s), the line dividing the 
two Cold War country groups was also the stopping line where 
the flow of new technology, industry know-how and other ideas 
from the United States ceased. Up until today, the United 
States is the most powerful country producing new ideas in the 
20th century.
Eventually, these old Cold War adversaries all have been 
targeted by the Soviet Union as investors. In that sense, 
Japan and South Korea are no longer viewed as Cold War adver­
saries but rich neighbours that can be tapped. In the past
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forty years, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan were quick to milk 
their security relationship with the United States for 
economic advantage. While Japan's military "free ride" is a 
favourite target of American critics, South Korea's rapid eco­
nomic rise has also been accelerated by American economic and 
military aid and the subsidy provided by the US for its mili­
tary deployment there. In the case of Taiwan, with the long 
preoccupation with China as a military threat (before the 
Sino-US rapprochement), the United States pumped massive aid 
into the island to build it up as a counterweight. Taiwan, 
like South Korea, continued to receive trade concessions under 
the Generalised System of Preferences until January 1989. Now 
the island has piled up US$ 71 billion in foreign exchange re­
serves. Out of a total US$ 109 billion US trade deficit in 
1989, Tokyo (US$ 49 billion), Taipei (US$ 13 billion) and 
Seoul (US$ 6.3 billion) accounted for nearly two-thirds.4®
From the Soviet point of view, Japan and South Korea not 
or.ly have the capital available for investment, their civilian 
technology and industrial know-how are attractive, too. As far 
as civilian technology is concerned, the trend is that it has 
becom increasingly capital intensive and the skills and in­
frastructure it requires continue to become more complex. In 
ccuntries like South Korea and Taiwan, as compared to the 
ascendant strata of world class producers, they may offer 
technology which is more appropriate to the needs of the
Soviet economy.
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Moreover, as far as the Soviet Far East and Sioberia are 
concerned, since the mid-1980s, opinion in the Soviet Union 
appeared to be veering towards the idea that these regions 
should concentrate on development along south-north rather 
than east-west axes. That is, the region should concentrate 
on becoming integrated with the large adjacent markets of the 
Pacific rim, especially the dynamic Northeast economies, ra­
ther than on the much more distant markets of the rest of the 
Soviet Union.50 In this respect, establishment of relations 
with South Korea is especially important.
Finally, towards the end of the 1980s, there came the 
time when the Soviet economic system came to the point of col­
lapse. The war in Afghanistan was a financial drain and is 
reputed to have cost the country 45 billion roubles over 8 
years.51 In 1989, the Soviet budgetary deficit climbed as 
high as 120,000,000,000 roubles, and domestic and interna­
tional debt soared to 460,000,000,000 roubles. Of the 1,000 
basic commodities required by the society, only some 120 items 
were available.53 Many of these problems are by nature struc­
tural problems. They include, a nonconvertible currency based 
on an irrational, multi-tiered pricing structure, a bureaucra­
tized economy that seldom rewards efficiency or innovation; a 
lack of entrepreneurial marketing or advertising experience; 
and a poorly motivated and undisciplined work force.53
The Soviets have had bad luck added to bad management. 
There was a crop failure in 1988, causing a blowout in imports 
which totalled US$50 billion in the past three years. A bud-
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gec deficit of 100 billion roubles in 1989 -- about 11% of 
gress domestic product -- was caused in part by the revenue 
shortfall that followed a plunge in the prices of Soviet ex­
ports. According to one observer, since the economic reform 
initiated in the mid-1980s, the economic problem in the 
Soviet Union is one in which "the stick of a command economy 
disappeared during the past several years, but the carrots of 
a market economy haven't yet grown".54 Problems tend to lead 
to problems, particularly when exacerbated by mismanagement. 
The deficit has been funded by printing money. In turn, the 
money supply increase has sparked inflation, which is estima­
te! officially to be around 80%, despite state controls on 
prices. The shortages are so great that people have little 
motivation to work. Enterprises see even less reason to deli­
ver goods to other enterprises. At the same time, in terms of 
the effectiveness of the central command system, it has come 
to a virtual stalemate in administration. Few of the previous 
commands from above are being issued. Those that are issued 
are frequently disobeyed. The most acute situation is the 
lack of consumer goods, food and durables. Having been neg­
lected for years, the consumer sector is fragile and out­
moded. Introduced under the Decree on the State Enterprise 
on 1 January 1988, tentative changes to management have, 
according to analysts, worsened the consumption crisis. 
Managers are now often elected by the workers. Not surpri­
singly, these managers seek to maintain their popularity by 
greeting wage increases absolutely unrelated to productivi­
ty.55 While wages continue to rise (in 1990 wages and sala­
ries have increased by about 12%),5  ^boosting demand, the sys-
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tem still produces nothing to help satisfy consumption demands 
of the population. The shelves in most state shops are half 
empty, and many have closed, officially "for repairs".
As economic pressure of such magnitude continued to 
build up in the late 1980s, Gorbachev quickened the steps of 
domestic and foreign policy adjustment. The period of 1989- 
present is a period in which Soviet Asian policy was to under­
go fundamental change. An important reason for such change is 
that, in Ziegler's words, Northeast Asia's sustained high 
economic growth rates make it a leading candidate for emula­
tion.^
Chapter III: Soviet Policy Towards Northeast Asia 1989-present
In this period, as compared to the 1985-1989 period, 
Soviet Asian policy adjustments have been put on a pragmatic 
basis. Instead of concentrating on putting forward proposals 
and initiatives, Soviet Asian policy makers turned to more 
concrete, bilateral and economic relations oriented adjust­
ments. Such Soviet Asian policy changes have been made 
against the background of a deteriorating economic situation 
at home. They include: Sino-Soviet rapprochement; establish­
ment of diplomatic relations with South Korea; and improvement 
of Soviet-Japanese relations.
Sin-Soviet Rapprochement. The major purpose for the improve­
ment of Soviet relations with China was to reduce tension and 
shake free of the burdens of the past, so as to take part into
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Northeast Asia's economic dynamism, and to participate more 
fully in the region's politics, establishing a more comprehen­
sive presence. However, in spite of earlier progress, Sino- 
Soviet rapprochement did not make much progress untill the end 
of the 1980s. Deng Xiaoping insisted that there would be no 
real improvement of bilateral relations until the four obsta­
cles (namely, the territorial dispute, the Kampuchea problem, 
the Afghanistan problem and the problem of Soviet troops sta­
tioned along Chinese border) —  or at least one of them in the 
beginning -- were dealt with. Brezhnev had begun the process 
of normalisation, but he refused all along to give ground on 
any of the Chinese leadership's four main conditions.
Under Gorbachev, the territorial dispute was solved ac­
cording to Chinese terms. In his December 1988 UN speech and 
his May 1989 speech in Beijing, Gorbachev promised to withdraw 
the remaining Soviet troops from Mongolia, to reduce the So­
viet armed forces by 500,000 men, 200,000 of whom will be 
withdrawn from Asia, and to scrap 10,000 tanks, 8,500 guns and 
800 combat aircraft. In Beijing, Gorbachev announced that 
120,000 of these troops would be cut from forces deployed in 
the Soviet Far East and that 16 vessels would be scrapped 
from the Soviet Pacific Fleet.Besides this commitment, to­
wards the end of 1988 Gorbachev yielded on the other two of 
China’s preconditions. He committed himself to ending the in­
vasion of Afghanistan —  not merely to satisfy the Chinese, 
but to that effect. Also, he began shifting the tone and 
thrust of his partnership with the Vietnamese. On this most 
important of the obstacles, as the Chinese ranked them, he had
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begun pressing the Vietnamese to settle for a political rather 
than a military resolution of the Kampuchea problem and, with 
or without it, to commit themselves to a military withdra-
C  Qwa..JJ In May 1989, with the Gorbachev-Deng summit, Sino- 
Soviet relations were finally normalised.
More dramatically, in a major boost for the rapidly 
warming Sino-Soviet relations, Moscow agreed to sell a squa­
dron of 24 Su27 combat aircraft at a "friendship" price of 
USS700 million. This arms deal has two important implica­
tions: first, the Soviet Union now badly needs hard currency 
for its economic reform. Now, one of the most salable things 
the country has is its advanced weaponry. It was reported that 
China had pressed for part of the transaction to be paid in 
barter, but that the Soviets, who are more strapped for cash 
than the Chinese, are accepting only hard currency payments.^ 
Second, the Soviet Union no longer views China as a major mi­
litary threat, otherwise it would not have sold such advanced 
weaponry to China.
Soviet Relations with Japan. Shevardnadze's visit to Tokyo in 
December 1988 provided the first distinct sign that Soviet 
leaders were beginning to face up to the fact that relations 
between the two countries could not progress until the Japa­
nese received some satisfaction on the Northern Territories 
issue. Actually, the Soviet leadership was determined to ad­
dress the issue of relations with Japan from a political as 
well as economic perspective. In terms of economic develop­
ment for the Soviet Far Eastern region, it is determined to
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tackle problems that stemmed from previous policies (both the 
command economy and the tendency of Moscow to treat the region 
as a military outpost rather than as an area capable of inter­
acting economically with the dynamic economies of Asia). As 
far as Japan is concerned, the Soviet perception become one 
that requires a Japanese shift of concentration away from con­
siderations of national sovereignty over territory to those 
of mutual cooperation in economic development. This is a ques­
tion, not merely of the disputed territories, but of the 
whole area of the Soviet Union lying to the north of Japan, 
and indeed of the eastern part of Siberia, and the maritime 
province. These areas form a region, the development of which 
could profit greatly in the long term from the infusion of Ja­
panese capital. However, the territorial dispute between the 
two countries is a matter concerning the status quo of Soviet 
borders with its neighbouring countries, which were esta­
blished after World War II. What is more, the settlement of 
the "northern territories" issue might have delicate implica­
tions at a time when internal ethnic and nationalist tension 
is building to an explosive point. Thus, the Soviet Union can 
understandably do nothing more at this time than admit that 
the "northern territories" are "in dispute".
Another reason for the Soviet reluctance to solve the 
territorial dispute now is that over the past two decades, the 
Soviet Union has turned the Sea of Okhotsk into a nuclear 
strike base for its submarines against the United States. The 
four disputed islands provide a natural protection for the 
Soviet nuclear submarines there, for they lie at the southern
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end of the Kurile chain separating the Sea of Okhotsk from the 
Pacific, and control over the passages between the islands. 
These islands then facilitates detection and destruction of p 
enemy submarines entering the Sea of Okhotsk in pursuit of 
Soviet SSBNs. Even under the new circumstance, for the Soviet 
leadership, strategic concerns like this are still important. 
Before Gorbachev's April 1991 visit to Japan, Soviet defence 
minister Dmitri Yazov forcefully insisted that all four is­
lands are vital to Soviet national security and could not be 
exchanged for Japanese economic aid. "The people who fought 
in the 1945 war oppose the return of the islands to Japan," 
Yazcv said. "Gorbachev certainly cannot decide on this issue 
alor.e. "
On the Japanese side, there is great pressure on the 
government to avoid any retreat from Japan's rigid position on 
the Northern Territories. That pressure came not only from 
the entrenched Foreign Ministry position that Japan should not 
settle for anything less than the eventual return of all four 
islands, it has been strongly reinforced recently by insis­
tence from the Ministry of Finance that Japan should not risk 
committing major financial resources to an unstable Soviet 
Unicn. Since the Japanese economy is now much less energy 
and raw material intensive than two decades ago, Japanese 
overseas investors are thus more interested in higher value 
added production. The Soviet Union obviously does not have 
the infrastructure for this kind of production, and its access 
to the international market is yet to be developed. Further­
more, many Japanese (and Western) academics and politicians
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are convinced that money offers no means to save the Soviet 
economy unless effective structural changes are made. Post 
World War II Marshall Plan money was effective in Western 
Europe and American loans and expenditures worked in Japan 
because the human capital and institutions (public and pri­
vate) were already in place, they argue.^
Hence, in Tokyo, Shevardnadze and the Japanese agreed to 
establish a permanent working group at the vice foreign minis­
ter level charged with exploring the possibility of concluding 
a peace treaty. It was to be, the Soviet foreign minister 
said, a mechanism by which "the entire complex of problems" on 
both sides would be addressed. Although Soviet-Japanese nor­
malisation still has quite a way to go, these are still signi­
ficant developments.
South Korea ’s Northern Diplomacy and Establishment of Diplo­
matic Relations with South Korea. It must be noted that al­
though it was South Korea that took the initiative, the Soviet 
Union was eager for an opportunity to upgrade its relations 
with South Korea. When South Korea knocked on its door with 
"Northern Diplomacy", the Soviet Union reacted with a rapid 
and positive response.
In fact, for the Kremlin, the need to attract economic 
assistance from its Asian neighbours was so urgent that not 
only South Korea, but Japan and Western European countries as 
well have been listed as potential investors. In that sense, 
establishment of diplomatic relations with South Korea might
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well serve as a symbolic gesture to other countries that on 
Kremlin's part, the Cold War is over, and in a desperate 
search for economic partners, it is ready to distance itself 
from its traditional political ally, North Korea.
As South Korea begins to be politically and economically 
more assertive, and based on the tremendous economic progress 
it has achieved in the last two decades and the rapid poli­
tical transformations that have occurred since Roh Tae Woo 
came to power in 1988, the South Korean government launched a 
diplomatic campaign called "Northern Diplomacy" in late 1987. 
This South Korean initiative appeared to be supported by the 
U.S. government.64 The core of this "Northern Diplomacy" is 
to improve relations with the communist states, especially 
North Korea's traditional allies: the Soviet Union and China. 
On 2 January 1989, President Roh Tae Woo claimed that South 
Korea would establish diplomatic relations with the Soviet 
Union and China before the end of his tenure of office.65
As a start, the Roh Tae Woo administration was deter­
mined to make the Seoul Olympic Games held in September 1988 a 
genuinely global festival. It turned out to be a tremendous 
diplomatic success for South Korea, for all communist coun­
tries except North Korea and Cuba participated in the games. 
As President Roh Tae Woo put it,
These are the first Games in 12 years where all 
countries, from the West as well as from the East, are 
coming together. It is particularly important that the 
Games are taking place here [in Seoul], in a troubled 
land. It symbolises the need to seek world peace and 
provides an opportunity for East-West reconciliation.66
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The first breakthrough in South Korea's Northern Diplo­
macy came on 2 February 198 9 when Hungary and South Korea 
established full diplomatic relations, the first South Korea 
had with a socialist country since its creation in 1948. North 
Korea, reacted angrily by recalling its ambassador to Buda­
pest, and threatened to downgrade diplomatic relations with 
Budapest to the charge d'affaires level, in a bid to prevent 
other Eastern bloc countries, especially the Soviet Union from 
developing formal relations with South Korea. However, the 
Soviet priority at the moment is no longer one of military 
confrontation with the US-led alliance in Asia. Consequently, 
the strategic value of North Korea for the USSR has decreased 
and such action has no significant leverage on Soviet foreign 
policy at all. Following Hungary, Poland, Yugoslavia, Czecho­
slovakia, Bulgaria and Mongolia all established diplomatic 
relations with South Korea.
After the 1988 Olympic Games, the Soviet Union entered a 
process of normalisation of relations with capitalist South 
Korea to gain investment, industrial know-how, and managerial 
expertise, all of which are badly needed in the country's mar­
ket reform. To do this, the Soviet Union is now seeking a 
two-Korea policy by beginning to decouple the Korean issue 
from its global strategy and South Korea from its traditional 
relations with North Korea.67 To be exact, what is new in 
Soviet foreign policy is that with the Soviets seeking global 
detente abroad while carrying out glasnost and perestroika at 
home, Northeast Asia is being considered in the light of So-
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viet domestic reforms for economic development and political 
opening. So far as the Korean peninsula is concerned, they are 
determined to modify their defacto-two Korean policy into a de 
jure two-Korea policy in order to attract economic cooperation 
from South Korea.
This development poses a sharp contrast to the Soviet 
"old thinking”, which remained in the military buildup in the 
West Pacific against the United States and Japan. For this 
reason, the Soviets had been committed to defend North Korea 
as a buffer against US, Japanese and even Chinese power by in­
creasing military and economic assistance for the country. 
Uncer Gorbachev, towards the end of the 1980s, "new thinking" 
in the Soviet strategy is well expressed in its normalised re­
lations with China and in the efforts to integrate the Soviet 
Far East into the international division of labour in the 
Pacific, as well as in attempts to lessen military threats by 
recucing their own military deployment in Vietnam, Mongolia, 
Sikeria and the West Pacific.
A mere nine months after Shevardnadze's assurances to 
the North Koreans that no diplomatic ties with South Korea 
were contemplated, the Soviet Union and South Korea announced 
in September 1990 that the two countries would establish dip­
lomatic relations. In December 1990, South Korean President 
Roh Tae Woo visited Moscow to sign the "Moscow Declaration". 
Roh and Gorbachev agreed to exclude the use of military force 
in the solution of Korean question and to build confidence 
through dialogue. Roh, in connection with inter-Korean rela-
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tions, emphasised a gradual arms reduction to achieve a ba­
lance of military power between the two sides through mutual 
confidence. In response, Gorbachev promised to render support 
in that direction.
In return for Gorbachev's newly granted political and 
diplomatic support, Roh told his host that "because the econ­
omic structures of our two countries share many complementary 
features, I believe there exist unlimited potential rewards 
from our bilateral cooperation".
After the Olympic Games, South Korea wasted no time in 
accelerating economic cooperation with the Soviet Union and 
other East European countries. It is reported that competi­
tion to invest in the development of Siberia among South Ko­
rean financiers and industrialists was intense. On the part 
of the South Korean government, it plans to establish a trade 
office in Vladivostok as the bridgehead in its economic march 
towards Siberia,69 which might have limitless potential to 
feed the raw-material-hungry South Korean industries with 
items like coal, steel and timber.
South Korean trade with the Soviet Union has jumped 
since the diplomatic thaw began m  1988. At their Cheju meet­
ing, Roh and Gorbachev predicted that two-way trade would 
total about US$10 billion by the mid-1990s. The embryonic 
economic relations were given a boost by a US$3 billion soft 
loan package to Moscow announced by Seoul in late January 
1991. It includes US$800 million in credits for purchases of
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South Korean goods in 1991 and US$1 billion in bank loans.70 
Actually, for the Soviet Union, normalisation of relations 
with South Korea is a double-edged policy, with the first ob­
jective to obtain substantial trade, investment and technology 
for economic development at home, and the second objective to 
use them as leverage in attracting similar cooperation from 
Japan and West European countries. Such Soviet diplomatic man­
oeuvre in Northeast Asia echoes its similar policy initiatives 
in Europe. In order to address the serious economic problems, 
the Soviet government now openly presses the West for large 
financial credits to ease the potentially explosive problem. 
Speaking to journalists during the 28th Communist Party Con­
gress, Deputy Prime Minister Mr. Leonic Abalkin, called for 
"sta-ilising credits" from the West. "We are not talking about 
help per se, but loans".71 In particular, the Soviet govern­
ment is interested in increasing the supply of consumer goods 
needed to gain public acceptance of economic reforms. Accor­
ding to one estimation, borrowing by the Soviet Union to fin­
ance imports contributed to a record US$3.8 billion trade de­
ficit in the first quarter of 1990 and an estimated US$10 bil­
lion rise in net indebtedness of the 1989 figure.72 During his 
April 1991 visit to Japan, Gorbachev adopted an almost plea­
ding tone in addresses both to business leaders and the Japan­
ese parliament when urging aid for the Soviet Union. He called 
for help in developing not only natural resources and a wide 
range of industries but also with major port, aviation and 
transport infrastructure projects.73 The French President, 
Mr. Mitterrand, said that if the West does not decide on im­
mediate aid, there is a risk that there will be neither a me—
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dium term for Gorbachev nor reforms in the Soviet Union. As 
early as in July 1990, both Germany and France wanted their 
Group of Seven partners to create a multi-billion-dollar aid 
programme for the Soviet Economy.74 As traditional trade part­
ners of the Soviet Union7 ,^ they have vested interest in not 
seeing the Soviet economy collapse.
After his visit to Japan, Gorbachev went to South Korea 
in April 1991 and worked hard for increased economic coopera­
tion with Seoul. He pushed for a dramatic expansion in bila­
teral trade, from US$900 million in 1990 to a projected US$1.5 
billion in 1991. Roh promised to release the first US$800 
million allocation in trade credits in 1991 to help alleviate 
the shortage of consumer goods in the Soviet Union. He also 
agreed to back investment plans by Hyundai and other South 
Korean conglomerates.7^
Indirect trade and investment relations between the 
Soviet Union and Taiwan have also been established. In March 
1990 the Taiwanese cabinet lifted a 40 year-old ban on direct 
trading between the two countries, and investment restrictions 
were removed. The Soviet Union indirectly shipped US$105.57 
million worth of lumber, minerals and industrial raw materials 
to Taiwan in 1989, a 242% surge over 1988. Export from Tai­
wan to the Soviet Union grew 914% to 35.77 million in the 
same period. Most exported items were consumer goods, elec­
trical appliances and information products.77
Page - 54
With these developments, those who had viewed the Soviet 
Union primarily as a military threat —  principally, China, 
Japan and South Korea -- began to see a more balanced, less 
menacing phenomenon.78 Politically, the Soviet Union is now 
seeking detente with every one of its potential enemies. In 
his September 1988 Krasnoyarsk speech, Gorbachev proposed 
holding multilateral talks among the USSR, the PRC, the DPRK 
and ROK to freeze and reduce naval and air forces and restrict 
their activities in the areas where these countries' coast­
lines converge. More recently, the Soviet Union has proposed 
to the United States bilateral talks to discuss the reduction 
of military operations in the North Pacific.79 The Soviet 
Union has also proposed to join international economic cooper­
ation such as the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum.
Economically, in order to shake off the economic burden 
of earlier Soviet commitments to Third World countries, in re­
gard to Soviet external economic practice, foreign aid to the 
Third World and international trade between former Comecon 
countries are to be restructured. In July 1990, Gorbachev gave 
formal notice to countries dependent on Soviet aid that in the 
future, foreign aid will be based on "our country's real re­
sources", and trade between former Comecon countries is to be 
conducted in hard currency from 1 January 1991.80 In November 
1990, the official news agency, Tass, reported: "Gratuitous 
assistance to foreign countries will be cut by 75%, as 
compared with the current year."81
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Chapter IV: Conclusion and Implications
By applying the conceptual framework of "structural po­
wer" I hope to have illustrated that in the Soviet Union, 
defence-oriented industrialization based on central planning, 
the expansion of its military strength, and perestroika at 
home and foreign policy adjustments in Northeast Asia are all 
interrelated issues. In Susan Strange's word, structural po­
wer indicates that who decides what shall be produced, by 
whom, by what means and with what combination of land, la­
bour, capital and technology and how each shall be rewarded 
is as fundamental a question in political economy as who de­
cides the means of defence against insecurity. In the 
Soviet Union, it was mainly Stalin, judging from the domestic 
and international situation of the 1920s, who decided to use 
the dictatorial central planning approach to ensure rapid de­
fence industrialisation. Such an approach did lead to a rapid 
military buildup, which in turn gave the Soviet Union a sense 
of security, but this was achieved at the expense of the 
Soviet population's daily livelihood. At times, Soviet mili­
tary expenditure made up as high as 30 percent of Soviet
o oGNP.°J Nevertheless, it can be argued that the Soviet Union's 
pursuit of defence-oriented industrialization worsened the 
situation. In response to the Soviet military buildup, the 
United States continuously built up its military strength; 
Japan was significantly rearmed; and at some stage China in 
the perception of some Soviet leaders was turned into the 
"16th member" of NATO.
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As the economic situation continuously deteriorated 
against the background of a ceaseless arms race with the 
United States and expansion of military commitments abroad for 
Soviet security, toward the end of the 1980s Gorbachev com­
mitted himself to the most radical changes in domestic and 
foreign policies in Soviet history. While carrying out 
market-oriented economic reforms at home, the Soviet Union is 
turning to the West and neighbouring Northeast Asian societies 
that have got the money to finance perestroika. This reguires 
appropriate diplomatic manoeuvre, because access to interna­
tional capital markets was only possible when guarantied by 
creditor country governments. International finance, then, be­
comes an important factor in the restructuring of interna­
tional relations in this new era.
In essence, the country's diplomatic manoeuvres and the 
present restructuring of international relations in Northeast 
Asia are a matter of industrial competition between states, a 
process that began in late 18th century Europe and spread 
throughout the world in this century. Given the way the sys­
tem of nation states is structured, it is highly desirable for 
any state to achieve rapid industrialization so as to give it­
self a sense of security. In the case of the Soviet Union, its 
industrialization programmes were carried out in competition 
with a group of countries which have been more successfully 
industrialised, and sustained by on-going technological inno­
vations. While the United States has built up enormous eco­
nomic strength in the past century, Japan, South Korea and 
Taiwan all benefited from their post World War II alliance
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with the American hegemon. As a result, this hegemonic al­
liance greatly accelerated their respective industrializa­
tions. The Soviet approach of defence industrialization 
through central command had been developed to facilitate ac­
celerated industrialization based mainly on the rapid mobili­
zation of capital, labour and material inputs, with lesser em­
phasis on their effective use. This approach implied the need 
to raise substantially the share of investment, to increase 
labour force participation rates and to redirect factors of 
production from agriculture to industry. Meanwhile the deve­
lopment of consumer goods production was neglected.®4 As a re­
sult, the Soviet economy is based on an unbalanced infrastruc­
ture. Born of war and European conquest,85 this central com­
mand economic system cannot be sustained because of overexten­
sion and the waste of the country's resources in a military 
superpower role. The industrial competition between these two 
sides ended up in the late 1980s with the economic inferiority 
of the Soviet side. In that sense, the Soviet Union is not a 
"normal" state. Advanced science and technology (often mili­
tarily oriented) coexist with an economy of Third World stan­
dards. In order to change this, as discussions above show, 
the Soviet Union tried to reform its domestic economy and seek 
detente and economic assistance with its former Cold War 
adversaries. Now let us look at some of the implications of 
these changes for international relations in the Northeast 
Asian region.
So far as the Soviet Union is concerned, as I have 
tried to illustrate, its foreign policy adjustments are as
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much related to the country's economic foundation of the past 
as to the fate of perestroika in the near future. We thus 
need to look at the prospect of economic reform in the Soviet 
Union first.
Prospect of economic reform in the Soviet Union. In light of 
the above discussions, there is no guarantee of success in the 
market-oriented economic restructuring in the Soviet Union for 
the next five or ten years. Instead, a decade or two of con­
fusion might result. In the Soviet Union, economic reform is 
painfully leading the country to a market-oriented economy. 
However, such restructuring is by no means going to be smooth. 
As a start, in spite of a record harvest in 1990, the country 
even has considerable difficulties in food supply because 
first, the food distribution system deeply suffered from in­
frastructural setbacks. Second, much of the harvest disp- 
peared into private stocks, to be sold in the winter for high­
er prices, and much of it was retained in food—producing 
areas, instead of being delivered to state warehouses in the 
cities, with the same objective. EC leaders, acknowledging 
the Soviet Union's increasingly desperate economic plight, 
discussed preparations at a summit meeting in Rome in late 
October to send food aid to the Soviet Union in November 1990.
Ironically, food supplies stored up in West Berlin during 
the heyday of the Cold War era against a potential Soviet 
blockade were used in the winter of 1990 to provide more 
variety for the Russian diet. This incident shows the magni­
tude of a military superpower's economic problems.
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Moreover, as political developments in recent months in­
dicate, the Soviet leadership now faces the problem of legiti­
macy. Such legitimacy, to a large extent, stemmed from the 
Soviet role in the defeat of Nazi Germany in World War II. In 
the post War years, it relied on the continued expansion of 
Soviet military power rather than on the progress of the econ-
o nomy. ° As perceived by the Soviet leadership, national secu­
rity depended on maintaining a military balance with a group 
of much richer adversaries. Thus military buildup has repea­
tedly been the priority in Soviet politics and economics. This 
decades-long obsession with security, led to disproportionate 
military expenditures. To a large extent, these has drained 
the country's resources, especially since the Sino-American 
rapprochement, with the effect that the Soviet economy is dri­
ven to a point of collapse.
There is no guarantee of any quick success of peres­
troika. During the chaos of the early 1980s, Polish national 
income fell by 22% in three years. The decline in Soviet out­
put may prove to be worse. It will take the society perhaps 
years to locate the problems and develop a workable reform 
formula based on a sophisticated understanding of the market 
that is suitable for Soviet conditions. After operating along 
Stalinist, anti-market logic for decades, and having been 
sealed off from the international trends of economic develop­
ment, the society's understanding of the "market" is distorted 
and limited. There is no ready model of a market economy that 
can be copied by the reformists. Each capitalist market so­
ciety evolved in its own special way and each now has its own
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problems. As far as perestroika is concerned, a period of 
confusion may be predicted. It then might take some time to 
introduce and establish the necessary frameworks and institu­
tions for a so called "market" economy to operate. Adequate 
market infrastructure would require, for example, development 
in telecommunications, transportation, and financial services. 
Training for managers who have a good basic education but are 
completely unfamiliar with conducting business in a competi­
tive environment is critical. The scope of such training is 
enormous considering that there are some 46,000 industrial en­
terprises and the need to train several employees in each of 
these enterprises.88 After all, Soviet society was based on 
Marxist principles of building "socialism" upon "capitalism". 
Now, to build "capitalism" upon this Soviet version of "socia­
lism" is a real challenge.
I am not arguing that there is no hope for the reforms 
in the USSR. My view is that in the process of reform and re­
structuring, resistance to change will come from social groups 
and their coalitions that have benefited from vested political 
and economic interests of all kinds. Therefore, successful 
transformation in the society requires a lot of statesmanship, 
bargaining, a little bit of luck, and above all, a sophisti­
cated understanding of the "capitalist market economy". All 
these factors pose challenges to the leadership simultan­
eously. This, of course, is the most difficult uphill task in 
the new era for any leadership.
Page - 61
With this at least medium-term internal preoccupation on 
economic restructuring, the basic thrust of Soviet detente 
with former Cold War adversaries would probably continue for a 
while, as evident in the Soviet acceptance of German unity 
under West German leadership and inclusion of an united Ger­
many into NATO. After all, it was the Soviet Union under 
Gorbachev, which made the fundamental decision to end the Cold 
War. Now the country has become far too dependent on capita­
list economic aid to run any risk of going back to the old 
enmity. However, this does not mean that the world is going 
to have eternal peace. In Rostow's words, diplomatic and 
military history will not end.®^
Implications for the Strategic Structure in Northeast Asia in 
the 1990s. Without doubt the Soviet Union is going to carry 
out military reform, but it is going to be a quantitative 
rather than a qualitative cut. According to Army General 
Moiseev, Chief of the General Staff, large scale arms reduc­
tions and structural changes will lead to leaner Soviet forces 
estimated to stand at 3 to 3.2 million men by the year 2000. 
Ground forces are expected to be cut by 10-12 percent, yet the 
Soviet High Command intends to maintain their rapid deployment 
capability for wartime emergency. Air Defence Forces will be 
cut by 18-20 percent but are said to retain their status of 
permanent alert forces. The number of units in the Strategic 
Nuclear Forces is expected to be reduced by over 30 percent.
However, among the services, the Navy will not be as 
heavily affected by force cuts, according to some observers.^
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In fact, since 1988, Soviet Pacific-based air and naval forces 
for "combined arms" maritime operations have been upgraded, 
and clear evidence -- in the form of the current shipbuilding 
programme -- appears to point to a continuation of that trend.
This reflects the uneasiness of the Soviets with the mili­
tary power structure in Northeast Asia in the 1990s. With the 
naval defence posture remaining intact, there is little change 
in Soviet military power in the West Pacific. In part, this is 
the Soviet reaction to the United States' lack of interest in 
Naval arms control. From the Soviet point of view, the per­
ceived military threat in the 1990s will mainly come from the 
United States and Japan.
Moreover, although the Cold War power structure has col­
lapsed, at the global level it must be stressed that existing 
huge nuclear arsenals remain and will still exist even after a 
START agreement. Modernisation in these deadly weapon systems 
is proceeding in the United States and the Soviet Union, with 
the potential for destabilization. In the Soviet Union, the 
level of economic desperation is such that it will be an in­
tractable problem for any Soviet government to reduce the mi­
litary industry rapidly. It is one of the relatively few areas 
of the economy that at least continues to function at some le-
Q  O
vel.y This is a real dilemma for the Soviet Union, because 
as far as the country's desperate need for hard currency is 
concerned, military hi-tech products are one of the most sala­
ble things for the world market. While the military-industrial 
complex will push for such sales to maintain employment and
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revenue, the defence ministry is concerned with the country's 
security.
Implications for the Korean Peninsula. Since the end of World 
War II, the Korean Peninsula has been one of the "trouble 
spots" in global politics. A relentless military buildup has 
gone on for more than thirty years on both sides of the demi­
litarised zone which was established at the end of the Korean 
War. The two Koreas have competed doggedly for international 
support and recognition. Most essential to Seoul and Pyong­
yang were the four big powers' support. Before 1990, the 
Soviet Union and China had formal relations only with North 
Korea, while Japan and the United States have diplomatic rela­
tions only with South Korea. With dramatic changes in Soviet 
Asian policy, international relations (including inter-Korean 
relations) in the peninsula are bound to be readjusted.
An important reason for such readjustment is that South 
Korea now has the economic strength to make itself heard on 
the noisy international political stage. Four decades after 
the division of the Korean peninsula, South Korea has grown to 
possess over twice the population and four times the GNP of 
North Korea. This power imbalance helped to bring the North 
Koreans to the negotiation table repeatedly with the South 
despite the continuation of the annual joint military exercise 
between American and South Korean forces.
As discussions above show, following the 1988 Olympics, 
covert Soviet-South Korean economic relations became more and
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more open. In the good old days, North Korea could play one 
communist giant against the other (China and the Soviet Union) 
to promote its national interests. However, the North Koreans 
have painfully discovered that they can no longer hold back 
the tide of history by playing one communist giant against the 
other. This North Korean fear was expressed by Ambassador to 
Beijing, Chu Chang Zun: "Our Soviet comrades have told us that 
they will not establish any political or diplomatic 
relationship with South Korea, that they will just have a sim­
ple economic and trade relationship on an informal level", re­
ferring to assurances delivered by Shevardnadze when he visi­
ted Pyongyang in late December 1988.93 But nine months after 
such assurances, the Soviet Union established diplomatic rela­
tions with South Korea.
In North Korea's view, the most serious threat to the 
Kim II Sung regime comes from its military rival South Korea. 
While "Northern Diplomacy" is a success for South Korea, it is 
a nightmare for the North. As President Roh Tae Woo reiter­
ated when he visited the United States in October 1988, the 
purpose of establishing contacts with the communist states was 
not to isolate North Korea (although in effect it did), but to 
neutralise North Korea's allies in case of a Northern 
attack. North Korean security depends on Soviet and Chinese 
support, militarily and economically.
Throughout the Cold War years, North Korea depended on 
the Soviet Union and China for its security just as South 
Korea depended on the United States. The United States and
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South Korea signed a security treaty in 1953. In 1961 a secu­
rity treaty was signed between the Soviet Union and the DPRK. 
China had signed a security treaty with North Korea in the 
same year, but lacked the capability to supply North Korea 
with modern arms or to pose a threat to the US with strategic 
nuclear weapons. Throughout the years, North Korea remained 
dependent on the Soviets for aircraft, missiles and other 
types of advanced military equipment.^ in short, in the 
Soviet-North Korean relationship, North Korea needs the Soviet 
Union more than the Soviet Union needs it. Conse-quently, 
since the Soviet Union decided to change its foreign policy 
towards Northeast Asia, there is very little bargaining power 
on the part of North Korea even when it involves its vital 
interests.
After the Olympic Games in 1988, for obvious reasons, 
the Soviet Union has exercised great restraint in its military 
and economic cooperation with the North Koreans. Their joint 
naval exercises were terminated in 1988, and the Soviet Union 
will demand hard currency from North Korea in its future bila­
teral trade. Frustrated, isolated, ostracised and facing 
serious economic problems, North Korea has been forced to 
accept both China and the Soviet Union's establishing diploma­
tic and trade relations with the South. In spite of North 
Korea's reluctance and resistance, it is now being forced to 
adapt to the changing international environment and make 
adjustments in its foreign policy.
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Therefore, North Korea has now modified its foreign po­
licy by moving towards defacto acceptance of separate appli­
cations to join the United Nations and the "cross recogni­
tion" formula it has long rejected. While pressing for a 
quick normalization with Japan, North Korea opened a dialogue 
with the United States by initiating direct talks between the 
two coun-tries' diplomats in Beijing. On January 24 1989, 
North Korea’s ambassador to Beijing told reporters,
our country is on the globe, and the US is also on the 
globe. Living on one globe, it is impossible for us to 
have no contact whatever. If the US withdraws their 
troops from South Korea and does not interfere in our 
internal affairs, there will be no conflict in our 
relations.y°
At the same time, North Korea has quickened its steps in 
political and economic dialogue with the South. Chung Ju 
Yong, founder of South Korea's giant Hyundai industrial group, 
flew to Pyongyang from Beijing in January 1989 on a visit to 
North Korea unprecedented for a South Korean business leader, 
Mr. Chung said he had agreed in principle with the North to 
"jointly develop the far eastern region of Siberia" and to 
construct a shipyard and railroad-car plant in the North 
Korean city of Wonsan that would export products to the Soviet 
Union. It is hard to predict what kind of economic coopera­
tion between the two Koreas will eventually develop. But per­
haps most intriguing is the notion that North Korea could get 
the kind of quiet economic help from South Korea that East 
Germany obtained from West Germany. No one can confirm it, 
and theories about motives conflict. But one story has it 
that South Korean companies in 1988 quietly acquired about US$
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200 million of North Korea's foreign debt.^7 It is alleged 
that the North hoped economic ties would lull the South into 
relaxing security measures and questioning the need for the 
continued stationing of American troops on Korean soil. The 
South also stood to gain because such joint ventures would 
open up one of the world's most isolated societies and demon­
strate South Korea's economic strength to North Korea.
Under these new circumstances, there are only two op­
tions for North Korea as far as its security is concerned. 
The first is to accelerate its own weapon systems development, 
and the second, to seek economic and political detente with 
South Korea, Japan and the United States. The North Koreans 
seem to have taken both options at the moment, but the first 
option is increasingly difficult because the economy is in 
such a bad shape. According to General Riscass of the ROK-US 
Combined Forces Command, pilots for North Korea's Soviet built 
MiG-29 fighters, the most modern in Pyongyang's inventory, are 
permitted to train in the air only four hours per year. It 
indicates that "their fuel situation is very low." The second 
option, however, implies that it is going to be a process in 
which the North might be eaten up by the South, in a process 
similar to German re-unification.
Nevertheless, the Soviet Union has not abandoned North 
Korea altogether. Soviet military and economic assistance 
still flows into North Korea. In years ahead, Moscow will 
maintain such ties (although greatly reduced) to preserve its 
influence after Kim II Sung dies.
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In his most recent visit to South Korea in April 1991, 
Gorbachev reaffirmed that he would take up Kim II Sung's invi­
tation to visit Pyongyang, as well as making another trip to 
Seoul to help break the deadlock between the North and South. 
This was seen as a significant new Soviet initiative on the 
Korean issue. Soviet officials said they were consulting 
China on pending problems, such as Seoul's application to join 
the UN and North Korea's reported development of nuclear wea­
pons. In talks with Roh, Gorbachev conceded that if Pyongyang 
continued to oppose separate entry into the UN by the two 
Koreas, Moscow would have no choice but to endorse Seoul's 
application at the Security Council. Soviet officials also 
publicly stated that unless North Korea accepts inspection by 
the International for Atomic Energy Agency of its nuclear de­
velopment facility, Moscow will stop providing nuclear fuel 
and technology.98 In sum, willing or not, North Korea is now 
forced to adapt to the present restructuring of international 
relations in Northeast Asia.
At the regional level, the Soviet alteration of its 
Asian policy indicates that the Cold War power structure cha­
racterised by acute military confrontation has now collapsed. 
However, the end of the Cold War in Northeast Asia does not 
mean that there is going to be eternal peace in the region. 
It is only that the Cold War power structure has col­
lapsed. In Northeast Asia, faced with a China with its giant 
though low-tech army struggling to modernise; a still power-
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ful United States; and an increasingly politically and econ­
omically assertive Japan, the Soviet Union will not abandon 
its military development altogether. At the moment, it is 
time for developing the country's economic muscles in a new 
approach, namely, through economic reform and global detente 
to attract foreign economic aid.
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